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Abstract
We study incentives for quality provision in markets where providers are motivated (semi-
altruistic); prices are regulated and ﬁrms are funded by a combination of block grants and unit
prices; competition is based on quality, and demand adjusts sluggishly. Health or education are
sectors in which the mentioned features are the rule. We show that the presence of motivated
providers makes dynamic competition tougher, resulting in higher steady-state levels of quality in
the closed-loop solutions than in the benchmark open-loop solution, if the price is suﬃciently high.
However, this result is reversed if the price is suﬃciently low (and below unit costs). Suﬃciently
low prices also imply that a reduction in demand sluggishness will lead to lower steady-state
quality. Prices below unit costs will nevertheless be welfare optimal if the providers are suﬃciently
motivated.
Keywords: Quality competition; Diﬀerential games; Motivated agents.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C73; H42; I18; I21; L13.
∗Corresponding author. Department of Economics and Related Studies, and Centre for Health Economics, University
of York, Heslington, York YO10 5DD, UK; and C.E.P.R., 90-98 Goswell Street, London EC1V 7DB, UK. E-mail:
ls24@york.ac.uk.
†Department of Economics/NIPE, University of Minho, Campus de Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal; and HEB,
Department of Economics, University of Bergen. E-mail: o.r.straume@eeg.uminho.pt.
‡Department of Economics, University of Catania, I95129 Catania, Italy. E-mail: cellini@unict.it.
11 Introduction
In markets for health care or education, prices are often regulated and consumer choices are mainly
based on other criteria, such as travelling distance and quality. In both types of markets, competition
between publicly funded providers has become an increasingly topical policy issue in recent years,
as an increasing number of countries have introduced market-based reforms which give providers
(hospitals or schools) incentives to compete for consumers (patients or students).1 This has, in turn,
spurred a considerable body of theoretical literature studying the nature of quality competition in
regulated markets.2 However, with very few exceptions, this literature has ignored two arguably
important features of such markets, namely motivated providers and sluggish demand.
In the literature on health care supply, it has long been recognised that providers may exhibit
semi-altruistic preferences.3 For example, physicians are typically portrayed as ‘imperfect agents’
for their patients, trading oﬀ patient beneﬁts against lower proﬁts (see, e.g., McGuire, 2000). This
notion has in recent years been complemented by an emerging literature on motivated agents in the
broader public sector, where the assumption of ‘mission oriented’ workers (doctors, nurses, teachers)
implies that the agents (e.g., hospitals or schools) to some extent share the objectives of the principal
(government, in our examples).4 Despite the emphasis given in the literature to the importance of
motivated providers in the public sector in general, and in sectors like health care and education
in particular, this aspect is largely absent in the existing literature on quality competition between
publicly funded providers. A notable recent exception is Brekke, Siciliani and Straume (forthcoming),
who analyse hospital competition with regulated prices and show that the presence of provider
motivation can potentially reverse a previously established positive relationship between competition
and quality.5
1These reforms typically include the combination of free choice of provider and activity-based payments. In health
care, the original model for an activity-based payment system is the US Medicare and Medicaid programmes, where
every hospital is paid a Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) tariﬀ for every patient treated. Diﬀerent variants of DRG
pricing have now been introduced in a number of Western countries.
2See, e.g., Ma and Burgess (1993), Wolinsky (1997), Gravelle (1999), Lyon (1999), Del Rey (2001), Beitia (2003),
Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume (2006, 2007), Karlsson (2007) and Matsumura and Matsushima (2007).
3See, e.g., Ellis and McGuire (1986), Chalkley and Malcolmson (1998), Eggleston (2005), Heyes (2005), Jack (2005)
and Kaarbøe and Siciliani (2011).
4See, for example, Francois (2000), Murdock (2004), Glazer (2004), Besley and Ghatak (2005, 2006), Delfgaauw
and Dur (2007, 2008) and Prendergast (2007). See also Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) for an extensive review of
the motivated agents literature.
5See Brekke, Siciliani and Straume (forthcoming) for a more extensive discussion of the assumption of motivated
providers, with further references to relevant literature (including experimental evidence).
2For both health care and education, quality is a key market variable. In health care, since
consumers are insured against medical expenditures, the quality of care is usually a much more
relevant variable than price for the patient’s choice of provider. Similarly, in education markets
tuition fees play a relatively minor role in most European countries (though they are on the rise in
several countries like England or Italy), and the quality of the institution is typically much more
important for the student’s choice of school or university. However, since quality is much less readily
observable than prices, it is also reasonable to assume that demand adjusts much more sluggishly
to quality changes than to price changes. This eﬀect may be particularly strong in the context of
health care or education, due to consumer habits or trust in speciﬁc providers. If consumers have
sluggish beliefs about quality, demand will adjust sluggishly to quality changes, implying that it
takes some time before the potential demand increase due to an increase in quality is fully realised.
The implications of sluggish demand for quality competition in regulated markets are analysed by
Brekke et al. (forthcoming), using a diﬀerential-game framework where providers choose qualities
in each period and demand adjusts sluggishly over time.6 However, that paper follows the standard
assumption in the literature on quality competition in regulated markets by assuming that providers
are pure proﬁt-maximisers.
In the present paper we combine the two above-mentioned features — motivated providers and
sluggish demand — in a diﬀerential-game framework where providers are funded by a combination of
block grants and unit prices, and compete on quality. We consider three diﬀerent solution concepts:
the open-loop, the memoryless closed-loop and the feedback closed-loop solutions. The purpose
of our analysis is threefold. First, we compare the steady-state levels of quality in the diﬀerent
solution concepts to see whether more intense competition (closed-loop rules) actually yields higher
quality levels in the steady-state solution of the game. Second, we investigate the eﬀect on steady-
state quality of increasing the degree of competition, either through lower travelling costs (increased
substitutability) or less demand sluggishness. Third, we perform a welfare analysis where we derive
the ﬁrst-best optimal quality, both in and oﬀ steady state, and show how the optimal solution can be
achieved by optimal price regulation, depending on the dynamic decision rules used by the providers.
Throughout the analysis, a main concern for us is to show how the degree of provider motivation
qualitatively aﬀects our results.
6A more extensive discussion of the sluggish demand assumption is given in Brekke et al. (forthcoming).
3When comparing the open-loop and closed-loop solutions of the game, we show that the presence
of motivated providers changes the dynamic nature of quality competition and therefore makes a
substantial diﬀerence. Furthermore, we show that the design of the provider payment system, i.e.
the combination of block grants and unit prices, plays a crucial role in determining the outcome
of dynamic quality competition. This is of policy relevance since payment systems change across
countries and have changed over time. For example, hospitals in England used to be paid according
to a block grant (with eﬀectively a zero unit price) but are now paid according to an activity-based
funding rule where the price varies for each type of procedure performed (similarly to the DRG —
Diagnosis Related Groups — payment system within Medicare in the US). Several European countries
like Italy and Spain have experimented with pricing rules where the unit price drops to 20-30% after a
certain volume of activity has been reached: given high demand levels many hospitals are eﬀectively
operating at these lower unit prices. An interesting case is Norway where for several years prices
have been set at a level which ranges between 40% and 60% of the average cost: the price is set every
year by the government and has been set at either 40%, 55% or 60%.
In our diﬀerential game setting, the solution rules adopted by agents (i.e., the providers) capture
the intensity of competition. The open-loop solution concept, used as a benchmark, implies that
providers set their optimal plans at the beginning of the time considered, and then stick to them
forever: in such a framework, competition is less intense as compared to behaviour rules in which the
providers consider the interaction with their opponents at each point of time, like in the feedback-
rule solution concept or in the memoryless closed-loop solution. We ﬁnd that steady-state quality
is higher when competition is more intense, if the price is suﬃciently high. On the other hand, if
prices are suﬃciently low, and below unit costs, this result is reversed, with steady-state quality
being higher in the open-loop benchmark case. Suﬃciently low prices (below unit costs) also imply
that lower travelling costs or less sluggish demand will reduce steady-state quality. The scope for
such a negative relationship between competition intensity and steady-state quality is larger if the
providers use closed-loop decision rules.
In the welfare analysis, we show that the optimal price which implements ﬁrst-best quality in
steady state is lower under open-loop behaviour than under closed-loop behaviour, unless providers
are highly motivated. We also show that, if providers are suﬃciently motivated, they are optimally
funded by a combination of block grants and unit prices, where the price does not fully cover unit
4costs. Furthermore, the scope for the optimal price to be below unit costs is larger if the providers
use closed-loop decision rules.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. This
model is then analysed for open-loop behaviour in Section 3 and closed-loop behaviour (feedback
and memoryless) in Section 4. Section 5 compares the steady-state outcomes of the three diﬀerent
solution concepts, while the relationship between competition intensity and steady-state quality is
explored in Section 6. A welfare analysis is presented in Section 7, while Section 8 concludes the
paper.
2 Model
Consider a market with two providers which are located at either end of the unit line S = [0,1].
Consumers are uniformly distributed on S with a total mass normalised to 1. We assume unit
demand, where each consumer demands one unit of the good from her most preferred provider. The
utility of a consumer who is located at x ∈ S and chooses Provider i, located at zi, is given by
u(x,zi) = v + kqi − τ |x − zi|, (1)
where v is the gross valuation of consumption, qi ≥ q is the quality oﬀered by Provider i, k is the
marginal utility of quality and τ is the marginal disutility of travelling. We assume that v > τ in
order to ensure that the market is always fully covered. The lower bound q is the minimum quality
the providers are allowed to oﬀer7 and is, for simplicity, set equal to 0. We also normalise by setting
k = 1, implying that τ measures the importance of travelling costs relative to quality.
The consumer who is indiﬀerent between Provider i and Provider j is located at   D, which is
implicitly given by
v − τ   D + qi = v − τ
 
1 −   D
 
+ qj.
The potential demand of Provider i is then given by







7We can interpret q as a minimum quality standard set by a regulator. If qi < q, Provider i might lose his license
to operate in the market. In the context of health care, qi < q can be interpreted as malpractice.
5As in Brekke et al. (forthcoming), we assume that demand adjusts sluggishly to quality changes.
Sluggish demand adjustments can be due to habitual behaviour or imperfect information about
quality among consumers, implying that it takes some time before changes in provider quality is
observed an acted upon in the market. Suppose that, at each point in time, only a fraction γ ∈ (0,1)
of consumers become aware of changes in relative quality oﬀered by the providers. This means that,
at each point in time, only a fraction γ of any changes in potential demand is realised. Deﬁning D(t)





D(t) = γ(  D(t) − D(t)). (3)
The lower is γ, the more sluggish is demand. The parameter γ is therefore an inverse measure of
the degree of demand sluggishness in the market. Notice that, since total demand is inelastic, the
dynamics of the demand for Provider i automatically determines the demand for Provider j, so that
both providers face the same dynamic constraint, given by (3).8
Providers are partially motivated and maximise a weighted sum of consumers’ utility and proﬁts.
The instantaneous objective function of Provider i is
 i (t) = T + pD(t) − C (D(t),qi (t)) + αBi(qi(t),D(t)), (4)
where T is a lump-sum transfer from the regulator and p is a price per unit of output provided. The
cost of provision is given by a cost function C (D(t),qi (t)), which for simplicity is assumed to take
the following linear-quadratic form:




i + F, (5)
where c > 0 is a constant unit cost of production, θ > 0 measures the cost of quality provision
8The law of motion of actual demand for Provider j is
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,





  D (t) − D(t)
 
.
6and F > 0 is ﬁxed costs. In order to ensure that the second-order conditions are satisﬁed in all
optimisation problems considered throughout the analysis, we assume that the parameters θ and τ




(v + qi − τx)dx (6)
is the instantaneous aggregate gross surplus of consumers attending Provider i. The degree to which
providers are motivated is measured by α ∈ (0,1).
We will compare diﬀerent game-theoretic solution concepts: the open-loop solution on one side,
and the feedback and memoryless closed-loop solutions on the other side. The open-loop solution
concept assumes that each provider knows the initial state of the system but cannot observe quality
(and thus potential demand) in subsequent periods; thus, each provider computes his optimal plan at
the beginning of the game and then sticks to it forever. Under the closed-loop solution concepts, on
the other hand, each provider can observe, and therefore react to, the value of the state variable(s)
in each period of time.
Within the closed-loop concepts, we focus on two diﬀerent rules: the feedback and the memoryless
closed-loop rules. According to the feedback rule, the optimal choice is derived from the Bellman
equation, and the choice variable of each provider at any time is related to the state variable at the
current date. The memoryless closed-loop rule is based on the Hamiltonian solution technique, but —
diﬀerently from the open-loop — takes explicitly into account the interaction between the rival’s choice
and the state variable(s) at any point in time. Both the feedback and the memoryless closed-loop
solutions are strongly time consistent.9
In order to ensure that steady-state quality is non-negative under all solution concepts considered,
we assume that the price is above a certain threshold level. More speciﬁcally, we assume that











9See Mehlman (1988) or Basar and Olsder (1995; Ch. 6) for details. See also Brekke et al. (forthcoming) or Cellini
and Lambertini (2004) for a comprehensive discussion of the mentioned solution concepts, with recent references to the
literature on diﬀerential games.
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 i (t)e−ρtdt, (8)
subject to
.
D(t) = γ(  D(t) − D(t)), (9)
D(0) = D0 > 0, (10)
where qi is the control variable. Denoting the current-value co-state variable associated with the
state equation by  i(t), the current-value Hamiltonian is10





















 i − θqi = 0, (12)
.
 i = ρ i −
∂Hi
∂D












and the transversality condition limt→+∞ e−ρt i(t)D(t) = 0. The second order conditions11 are






















An analogous condition is obtained for
.
qj.
Deﬁne as Q := qi − qj the diﬀerence in quality between the two providers. The dynamics of the
10For the remainder of the analysis, the indication of time (t) is omitted to ease notation.
11These are given by Hqiqi = −θ < 0, HDD = −ατ < 0 and HDDHqiqi − (HDqi)
2 = α(τθ − α) > 0.






























Q − D), (17)
which can be represented in a phase diagram in D-Q-space (Figure 1). If the initial demand for
Provider i is above one half (D > 1
2), then the quality diﬀerence Q is strictly positive and converges
towards zero as D converges towards the steady-state level (1
2).12 Intuitively, if the initial demand is
above one half, the marginal beneﬁt from quality is higher for Provider i as quality aﬀects a larger
number of consumers.13 Thus, for D0 > 1
2, Provider i has a stronger incentive than Provider j
to provide quality in the initial period of the game, implying a positive initial quality diﬀerence:
Q(0) > 0. However, on the equilibrium dynamic path, the quality diﬀerence is suﬃciently small
such that   D(Q) < D0, implying that Provider i’s potential demand is lower than its actual demand.
As demand for Provider i reduces over time, this provider’s incentive to invest in quality reduces
correspondingly, while the opposite is true for the rival provider. This process continues until the
steady state where quality and demand diﬀerences vanish.
[Figure 1 about here]
The steady-state level of quality (where D = 1
2 and
.
qi = 0) is given by
qOL =
2(p − c)γ + α(γ (2v + τ) + 2τρ)
4θτ (γ + ρ) − 2αγ
. (18)
It is straightforward to see that steady-state quality will be higher with a higher price or with more
motivated providers. The relationship between steady-state quality and the intensity of competition
(measured by τ−1 or γ), in the open- and closed-loop solutions, will be explored later in Section 6.
12The condition α < α also ensures stability in the saddle-path sense, i.e., there is only one admissible path which
leads to the steady state. Details are available upon request.




and thus increasing with demand.
94 Closed-loop solutions
4.1 Memoryless closed-loop rule
According to this rule, the problem (8), (9) and (10) of Provider i, with the corresponding Hamil-
tonian (11), must be solved by taking into account the interaction between the rival’s control variable
qj and the state D at any point in time. More speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst-order condition (12), the con-
straint (14), and transversality condition remain unchanged. However, the adjoint equation (13) has
to be replaced by the following:
.









where the term ∂Hi
∂￿ qj
∂￿ qj
∂D captures the interaction between the rival’s choice and the state. Provider i
explicitly considers the fact that, at any point in time, the state variable aﬀects the rival’s optimal
quality, which in turns aﬀects his own choice. Since
∂￿ qj
∂D = −α
θ (i.e., higher demand from Provider i
reduces the quality of Provider j); and ∂Hi
∂￿ qj = −
γ
2τ i (i.e., a higher quality of Provider j reduces the
utility of Provider i),14 condition (19) can be written as
.




















(p − c + α(v + qi − τD)) +
 








In the symmetric steady state, where D = 1/2 and qi = qj, we obtain the steady-state level of quality
in the memoryless closed-loop solution by solving for
.
qi = 0, yielding
qML =
2θγ (p − c) + α(2θ(ρτ + γv) + γ(τθ − α))
4θ(τθ(γ + ρ) − γα)
, (22)
which is also increasing in α and p.
14These properties are also due to the fact that providers’ motivation is such that each of them derives utility from
the satisfation of his own clients. Notice also that the property ∂  qj/∂D < 0 is consistent with the intertemporal
strategic substitutability of choice variables mentioned below.
15I.e., obtain qi from (12) and diﬀerentiate it with respect to time; substitute the dymanics of D and  i and substitute
 i by its expression from (12).
104.2 Feedback closed-loop rule
When solving for the feedback closed-loop solution, we restrict attention to stationary Markovian
strategies, obtaining a stationary Markovian Nash equilibrium in linear strategies. The full derivation
of the feedback solution is given in the Appendix. The equilibrium dynamic decision rules are found
to be
qi = φi(D) =
α
θ





qj = φj(D) =
α
θ






4θτ2 (p − c + αv) + 2τγσ2 (θτ − α) − γ2σ2
2







(2θτ (2γ + ρ) − 4αγ) −
 
(2θτ (2γ + ρ) − 4αγ)
2 + 12αγ2 (θτ − α)
 
< 0. (26)
From (23)-(24), notice that ∂qi/∂ (1 − D) < 0 and ∂qj/∂D < 0. Thus, according to the deﬁnition
given by Jun and Vives (2004), qualities are intertemporal strategic substitutes. That is, the control
(quality) of each player responds negatively to a positive change in the state (demand) of the other
player.16
Applying the steady-state condition D = 1/2 to (23)-(24), steady-state quality in the feedback
solution is
qFB =
12θγ (p − c + αv) + 10θατρ + 2αγ (θτ − α) + α
 
(2θτ (2γ + ρ) − 4αγ)
2 + 12αγ2 (θτ − α)
2θ
 
8γ (θτ − α) + 10θτρ +
 
(2θτ (2γ + ρ) − 4αγ)
2 + 12αγ2 (θτ − α)
  .
(27)
As in the open-loop and memoryless closed-loop solutions, steady-state quality is increasing in p and
α.
16From (23)-(24), it can easily be shown that
∂qi
∂(1−D) < 0 and
∂qj
∂D < 0 if α <
θτ(2ρ+5γ)
2γ . Our assumption of α < α
ensures that this condition is always met.
115 Comparison of steady-state quality levels
One of our main objectives is to investigate which solution concept yields the most competitive
outcome in terms of steady-state quality levels. A comparison of the previously derived steady-state
quality levels yields the following result:
Proposition 1 (i) If α = 0 or p =   p, then qML = qFB = qOL;
(ii) If α > 0 and p >   p, then qML > qFB > qOL;
(iii) If α > 0 and p <   p, then qOL > qFB > qML; where








Proof. From (18) and (27): qFB > (<)qOL if 2γΦ
 






   
> (<)0 where
Φ := 2(2θτγ + θτρ + αγ) −
 
(2(2θτγ + θτρ + αγ))
2 − 12θατγ (3γ + 2ρ) > 0.
From (18) and (22): qML > (<)qOL if 2γ2α
 






   
> (<)0. Notice that
Φ = 0 if α = 0, implying that qFB = qOL = qML if α = 0. For α > 0, the comparison between








. From (27) and (22): qML > (<)qFB if
γ
 √
Ψ − (2γ (θτ − α) + θτρ)
  






   
4θ(γ (θτ − α) + θτρ)
 
4γ (θτ − α) + 5θτρ +
√
Ψ
  > (<)0,
where Ψ := (θτ (2γ + ρ))
2 − αγ (θτ (5γ + 4ρ) − αγ) > 0. Notice that
√
Ψ − (2γ (θτ − α) + θτρ) > 0
since Ψ − (2γ (θτ − α) + θτρ)
2 = 3αγ2 (θτ − α) > 0. Thus, the comparison between qML and qFB







. The sign of this expression is determined
by the critical value of the price given by   p, which then determines the quality ranking stated in the
Proposition. Finally, notice that   p − p = α
2θγ (γ (2θτ − α) + 2θτρ) > 0.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition conﬁrms a result already provided by Brekke et al. (forthcoming).
Under pure proﬁt-maximising behaviour and with production costs that are linear in output, there is
12an absence of strategic interaction that yields the stated coincidence results.17 The second and third
parts of the proposition present results that, to the best of our knowledge, are new to the literature.
In regulated markets where motivated providers compete dynamically on quality, steady-state quality
is highest in the memoryless closed-loop solution and lowest in the open-loop solution, if the price
is above a certain threshold level. Otherwise, if the price is suﬃciently low, steady-state quality is
highest in the open-loop solution and lowest in the memoryless closed-loop solution. Notice that the
threshold value of p is such that the price mark-up on marginal cost is negative, i.e.,   p < c.
The intuition for these new results is found by noticing how the presence of motivated providers
aﬀects the strategic nature of quality competition. Suppose that Provider i increases its quality.
This reduces the number of consumers patronising Provider j and therefore also reduces the marginal
beneﬁt of quality investments for altruistic reasons (i.e., ∂Bj/∂qj is reduced). Consequently, Provider
j responds by reducing its quality. In other words, qualities are strategic substitutes at each point in
time.
If the price is suﬃciently high, p >   p, this strategic substitutability makes dynamic competition
tougher in the closed-loop solutions (under memoryless or feedback rules), where players can set
their quality choices according to the evolution of demand and taking into account the strategic
interaction at each instance of time. By increasing its quality today, Provider i can provoke a quality
reduction from its competitor tomorrow (and vice versa). Due to this strategic nature of the dynamic
competition, and due to the lack of any form of commitment over time, steady-state quality turns
out to be higher in the closed-loop solutions as compared to the open-loop case.
However, this conclusion holds only if each provider has a suﬃciently strong incentive to increase
demand. The lower the price is, the lower is the incentive to attract more consumers for proﬁt-
oriented reasons. If the price is suﬃciently low, such that the providers face a negative price-cost
margin (p < c), the incentive to attract more consumers for altruistic reasons is counteracted by
incentives to dampen demand for ﬁnancial reasons. Indeed, if the price is suﬃciently below marginal
costs (p <   p < c), implying that the incentives to compete for consumers are relatively weak, a more
collusive outcome with lower steady-state quality levels, is achieved under closed-loop rules. Notice
that provider motivation (α > 0) still ensures that quality levels are positive even if providers face
17Brekke et al. (forthcoming) only consider the open-loop and the feedback closed-loop solution. Here we conﬁrm
that the coincidence result also applies to the memoryless closed-loop solution.
13negative price-cost margins. With purely proﬁt-oriented providers, interior solutions would not exist
if p < c: for example, if hospitals maximise proﬁts and are paid through block grants they would
have no incentives to provide quality above the minimum level, which seems an obvious theoretical
conclusion, but an implausible scenario for the real world.
By drawing on the analysis of Brekke et al. (forthcoming), we can also say something about
the robustness of Proposition 1 with respect to alternative cost assumptions. In our analysis we
have, for simplicity, assumed constant marginal production costs. In a similar modelling framework,
Brekke et al. (forthcoming) show that steady-state quality is higher in the open-loop solution than
in the feedback closed-loop solution with increasing marginal production costs and proﬁt-maximising
providers. Thus, allowing for cost convexity is likely to increase the threshold level of provider
motivation above which steady-state quality is higher under closed-loop rules. More speciﬁcally, our
conjecture is that, with convex provision costs, quality will be higher under closed-loop decision rules
if the degree of provider motivation is suﬃciently high relative to the degree of cost convexity.
6 Competition intensity and steady-state quality
Let us now see how steady-state quality depends on the intensity of competition under the diﬀerent
solution concepts. In our model there are two reasonable measures of competition intensity; the
degree of competition increases if travelling costs become lower (a decrease in τ) and/or if demand
becomes less sluggish (an increase in γ). Notice that both of these measures can be inﬂuenced by
policy. For example, by making publicly available quality indicators measuring the performance of,
e.g., hospitals or schools, the government can increase consumer awareness about quality and thereby
reducing demand sluggishness.18
For tractability reasons, we restrict attention to the open-loop and the memoryless closed-loop
solutions. From Proposition 1 we know that these two rules always yield the highest and lowest
steady-state quality levels. From (18) and (22), we derive the following results:
Proposition 2 Consider the steady-state quality in the open-loop and memoryless closed-loop solu-
18An example of such policy measures is the publication of hospital and school ‘League Tables’ in the UK.






α(α(γ + 2ρ) + 4vθ(γ + ρ)) + 4θ(γ + ρ)(p − c)
2(γ (2θτ − α) + 2θτρ)
2
 








2θ(γ + ρ)(p − c + vα) + α2ρ
4(γ (θτ − α) + θτρ)
2
 























2θ(p − c) + α(α + θ(2v − τ))
(γ (2θτ − α) + 2θτρ)
2
 






2θ(p + vα) − α(θτ − α)
4(γ (θτ − α) + θτρ)
2
 
> (<)0 if p > (<)pγ,
where











If providers face a positive price-cost margin (p > c), there is an unambiguously positive relation-
ship between competition intensity and steady-state quality. Lower travelling costs or less sluggish
demand leads to a higher steady-state quality level both under open-loop and closed-loop rules. This
is what we would expect, as lower travelling costs and less sluggish demand make actual demand
more quality-elastic and therefore stimulate each provider’s incentives to increase quality.
However, the relationship between competition intensity and steady-state quality changes if the
providers’ face a suﬃciently low price (that is lower than marginal production costs). If the price-cost
margin is negative, the providers’ optimal quality choices result from two counteracting incentives,
as previously discussed. The providers have an incentive to increase quality for altruistic reasons
(α > 0) but they also have an incentive to reduce quality for proﬁt-oriented reasons (since p < c).
More quality-elastic demand, due to lower travelling costs or less sluggish demand, will strengthen
both these incentives, but the proﬁt incentive will increase more if the price is suﬃciently low,
15implying that steady-state quality will decrease.19
This result has potentially important policy implications. If policy makers try to stimulate quality
competition by publishing quality indicators in order to make demand less sluggish, this will have
the intended eﬀect only if the providers receive a suﬃciently high unit price. Otherwise, if the price
is too low, policy measures to stimulate quality competition by reducing demand sluggishness may
be counterproductive.
The scope for a negative relationship between competition intensity and steady-state quality can
be further explored by comparing the diﬀerent threshold values of p reported in Proposition 2:
Corollary 1 Since pγ > pML
τ > pOL
τ , a negative relationship between competition intensity and
steady-state quality is more likely (i.e., applies for a larger set of parameter values) if we consider a
reduction in demand sluggishness rather than travelling costs, and it is more likely if the providers
use closed-loop rather than open-loop rules.
7 Welfare
In this section we derive ﬁrst-best quality, in and oﬀ steady state, and analyse how ﬁrst-best quality
can be achieved by optimal price regulation. When analysing optimal price regulation, we restrict
attention to the open-loop and memoryless closed-loop solutions.
We deﬁne social welfare as the sum of producers’ and consumers’ surplus net of third-party
payments. Under the assumption that the providers face a limited liability constraint, the transfer
T will be set such that each provider breaks even. Social welfare at time t is then given by
W (t) = (1 + βα)
   D(t)
0
(v + qi (t) − τx)dx +
  1
D(t)















where λ > 0 is the opportunity cost of public funds. A non-trivial issue when deﬁning social welfare
in the presence of motivated providers is whether the altruistic part of provider preferences should
be included (implying that consumer utility is ‘double-counted’) in the welfare function or not. By
19These results resemble some of those reported in Brekke, Siciliani and Straume (forthcoming) who ﬁnd, in a static
setting, that the relationship between competition and quality is ambiguous in the presence of motivated providers.
16including a binary parameter β = {0,1}, we make the welfare expression suﬃciently ﬂexible to
incorporate both alternatives, double-counting (β = 1) and no double-counting (β = 0).
7.1 Steady-state analysis
We start out by deriving the ﬁrst-best optimal quality in steady state, where each provider serve
half of the market. Maximising (29) with respect to qualities yields the ﬁrst-best level of quality in
steady state:




Intuitively, higher costs of quality provision (θ) or higher opportunity costs of public funds (λ ) will
reduce the ﬁrst-best level of quality. On the other hand, allowing for double-counting of consumer
utility (β = 1) increases the ﬁrst-best quality, with the eﬀect of double-counting being stronger the
more motived providers are.
What is the optimal price that ensures that steady-state quality will be at the ﬁrst-best level?
This depends on the decision rules used by the providers. Under open-loop rules, the optimal price,
pOL, is implicitly given by qOL  
pOL 
= q∗, yielding
pOL = c +
(1 + αβ)(2θτ (γ + ρ) − αγ) − θα(1 + λ)(2(vγ + τρ) + τγ)
2γθ(1 + λ)
. (31)




pML = c +
2(1 + αβ)(θτ (γ + ρ) − αγ) − α(1 + λ)(2θ(vγ + τρ) + γ (θτ − α))
2γθ(1 + λ)
. (32)
A comparison of these two optimal prices yields the following result
Proposition 3 The optimal price is higher (lower) under the open-loop than under the memoryless
closed-loop solution if α < (>)  α := 1
1−β+λ.
Notice that the critical value   α is such that min
 
pOL,pML 




  p for α >   α. Thus, if the degree of provider motivation is suﬃciently low (α <   α) and the providers
use memoryless closed-loop rules, ﬁrst-best quality is achieved by setting a price pML >   p. At





= q∗. Therefore, a higher price (pOL > pML) is needed to induce ﬁrst-best quality in
the open-loop solution. However, this result is reversed if provider motivation is suﬃciently strong
(α >   α). In this case, ﬁrst-best quality is induced in the open-loop solution by setting a price
pOL <   p. At this price, steady-state quality is now lower when the providers use memoryless closed-
loop rules and the optimal price under the closed-loop solution is therefore higher. The latter case,
where pML > pOL, is more likely to occur in the absence of double-counting (β = 0) and when the
opportunity cost of public funds is high, which imply that the ﬁrst-best quality level is relatively
low. Notice that a positive opportunity cost of public funds (λ > 0) is a necessary condition for
pML > pOL, since   α ≥ 1 for λ = 0.
A further characterisation of the optimal price under the diﬀerent solution concepts is given by
the following result:
Proposition 4 Suppose that social welfare is deﬁned such that β = 0. In this case, there exist two
threshold values   α0 and   α1, where   α0 <   α1 < 1, such that the optimal price that implements ﬁrst-best
quality in steady state implies:
(i) a positive price-cost margin under both the open-loop and the memoryless closed-loop solution
if α <   α0;
(ii) a negative price-cost margin under the memoryless closed loop solution and a positive price-
cost margin under the open-loop solution if   α0 < α <   α1;
(iii) a negative price-cost margin under both the open-loop and the memoryless closed-loop solu-
tions if α >   α1.
Proof. From (31) we have that pOL (>) < c if
α(<) >   α1 :=
2θτ (γ + ρ)
γ + θ(1 + λ)(γ (2v + τ) + 2τρ)
< 1.
It is straightforward to conﬁrm that   α1 <   α. Thus, for α =   α1, the optimal price under the
memoryless closed-loop solution is even lower than under the open-loop solution; i.e., pML (  α1) <
pOL (  α1) = c. Since pML > c for α = 0 and pML is monotonically decreasing in α, there exists a
threshold value   α0 ∈ (0,   α1) such that pML < c if α >   α0.
18This result has interesting policy implications. If providers are suﬃciently motivated, they should
be optimally ﬁnanced by a combination of lump-sum transfers (T) and unit prices (p), where the
price does not fully cover the unit costs. Furthermore, the scope for an optimal price below unit
costs is larger if the providers use memoryless closed-loop rules. These conclusions hold if social
welfare is deﬁned such that consumer utility is not double-counted (i.e., if β = 0). If we allow for
double-counting (β = 1), the optimal price would be higher under both solution concepts (in order
to induce the higher ﬁrst-best quality level). This would reduce the scope for optimal prices below
unit costs.
It is also worth noticing that   α1 is decreasing in γ. Thus, less sluggish demand increases the
scope for an optimal price below unit costs under both solution concepts.
7.2 Dynamic welfare analysis
We now extend the welfare analysis to consider optimal price regulation oﬀ the steady state. In order
to derive the ﬁrst-best quality benchmark, suppose that the regulator can directly set the providers’
quality levels at each point in time. The ﬁrst-best dynamic quality paths are then given by the











D(t) = γ(   D(t) − D(t)), (34)
D(0) = D0 > 0, (35)
where W (t) is given by (29). Let  (t) be the current value co-state variable associated with the state
equation. The current-value Hamiltonian is20
H = (1 + βα)
   D
0
(v + qi − τx)dx +
  1
D
























20To ease notation, we drop the time index t.
19The solution is given by (a) ∂H/∂qi = 0, ∂H/∂qj = 0, (b)
.
  = ρ  − ∂H/∂D, (c)
.
D = ∂H/∂ , or
more extensively:
(1 + βα)D +
γ
2τ
  = (1 + λ)θqi, (37)
(1 + βα)(1 − D) −
γ
2τ
  = (1 + λ)θqj, (38)
.









to be considered along with the transversality condition limt→+∞ e−ρt (t)D(t) = 0. The above
conditions are also suﬃcient if H is concave in (qi,qj,D), which is the case for θτ > 1.21 By totally
diﬀerentiating (37), and using (39)-(40), the optimal solution is provided by:
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i =0 = θ > 0. (44)






























τ > 0. The ﬁrst-best solution is described
in Figure 2. Similarly to the equilibrium paths under the open-loop or memory-less closed-loop















is negative semideﬁnite. This is true if θτ > 1.
20solutions, quality and demand move together on the socially optimal path. For D0 > 1
2, the quality
for Provider i is higher than Provider j. Intuitively, if initially Provider i has more than half of
the market, the marginal beneﬁt from quality is higher for Provider i, as quality aﬀects a larger
number of consumers. As demand for Provider i reduces over time, the optimal quality for Provider
i (j) reduces (increases). This process continues until the steady state where quality and demand
diﬀerences vanish.
[Figure 2 about here]
Let us now see how the regulator can implement the ﬁrst-best quality paths oﬀ steady state by
choosing provider-speciﬁc and time-varying prices. We want to investigate how the optimal prices
depend on whether quality and demand are oﬀ the steady state or not, and how these prices diﬀer
according to whether the providers use open-loop or closed-loop rules.
Comparing (41) with (15), the optimal price for Provider i under the open-loop scenario is
pOL









D∗ − α(v + q∗












Recall that pOL, given by (31), is the optimal steady-state price when the providers use open-loop
rules. Whether the optimal oﬀ-steady-state price for Provider i is higher or lower than the steady-
state one depends on the sign of the following expression:
pOL






































Suppose that D0 > 1/2 and
1+βα
1+λ − α > 0, so that ﬁrst-best quality and initial demand are
above the steady-state levels for Provider i. There are three terms to account for. The ﬁrst term
takes into account the fact that the provider does provide higher quality when the demand is high,
but not as much as the regulator would like. The regulator needs therefore to increase the price.
The second term takes into account the extra utility for the provider from treating the marginal
consumer. There are two counteracting eﬀects: on one hand quality is higher than in the ﬁrst best
but transportation costs are also higher. Depending on the net eﬀect (i.e., whether the utility of the
21marginal consumer is higher or lower oﬀ steady state or in the steady state), the price tends to be





< 0) and therefore the provider has a lower incentive to provide quality, which needs
to be compensated with a higher price.
Comparing (41) with (21), the optimal price for Provider i under the memoryless closed-loop


























Using (46) and (48), the optimal dynamic prices under the open-loop and memoryless closed-loop
scenarios compare as follows:
pOL
i (t) − pML





Using the optimal steady-state prices under the two solution concepts, this expression can be rewritten
as
pOL
i (t) − pML
i (t) =
 























Once more, suppose that
1+βα
1+λ −α > 0 and D0 > 1/2, implying that ﬁrst-best quality and initial
demand are above the steady-state levels for Provider i. The ﬁrst term in (50) gives the diﬀerence in
optimal steady-state prices between the open-loop and memoryless closed-loop case. This diﬀerence
is positive for
1+βα
1+λ − α > 0 (cf. Proposition 4). The second term is also positive by the assumption
D0 > 1/2. The third term is always negative since
.
qi







< 0, as we can see
from the phase diagram in Figure 2. Therefore, the diﬀerence in optimal prices between the open-
loop and memoryless closed-loop cases can be larger or smaller oﬀ the steady state.22 An interesting
special case is when β = 0 (no ‘double-counting’ of consumer utility), so that q∗
i and D∗ do not
depend on altruism. In this case, when α is suﬃciently high the second term is small, which suggests
that the price diﬀerence will be smaller oﬀ the steady-state (as the third term is negative) and then
increase as the system converges to the steady state. This is most clearly seen by considering the limit
22Notice that in the steady state the second and third terms are equal to zero.
22case α =
1+βα
1+λ , where pOL = pML while pOL
i (t) < pML
i (t) oﬀ steady state. If α is marginally larger
than
1+βα
1+λ , the optimal price for Provider i is higher under open-loop than under closed-loop rules
in steady state (pOL > pML), while the opposite is true oﬀ steady state (pOL
i (t = 0) < pML
i (t = 0)).
8 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have analysed quality competition between publicly funded providers in markets with
sluggish demand, the prime applications of our analysis being health care and education (hospital
or school competition). We have shown that, in such markets, the presence of provider motivation
makes a crucial diﬀerence for the dynamic nature of quality competition. In contrast to previous
results in the literature, we have shown that steady-state quality is higher under closed-loop rules
(when competition is more intense) than under open-loop rules, if the providers face suﬃciently high
unit prices. Any price in excess of unit costs is suﬃcient to produce this result. However, the result is
reversed if the price is suﬃciently below unit costs). Interestingly, we have shown that the ranking of
steady-state qualities in the three diﬀerent solution concepts considered depends on a single threshold
value of the price. An implication of this is that both the highest and the lowest steady-state quality
levels are always to be found either in the open-loop or in the memoryless closed-loop solutions. In
contrast, the feedback closed-loop solution always provides intermediate levels of steady-state quality,
regardless of the price.
In markets with sluggish demand, policy makers can try to reduce demand sluggishness by col-
lecting and publishing quality indicators on a regular basis, in order to make consumers more aware
of quality diﬀerences between providers. As a policy measure to stimulate quality competition, we
have shown that this may be counterproductive if the providers face a price that is below unit costs.
Therefore policies with high unit prices and policies which increase information are complements. If
the price is suﬃciently below unit costs, more quality-responsive demand will reduce quality in steady
state, and this is more likely to happen if providers use closed-loop decision rules. Nevertheless, in
our welfare analysis we have shown that the optimal design of the provider payment system implies
prices below unit costs if the degree of provider motivation is suﬃciently high.
23Appendix: Solving for the feedback closed-loop solution
Using (6), Provider i’s instantaneous objective function is




i − F + α
 





which, together with (3), deﬁnes a linear-quadratic problem. The value function of Provider i is
therefore deﬁned as
V i(D) = σ0 + σ1D + (σ2/2)D2. (A2)
Focusing on stationary Markovian linear strategies, deﬁned by qi = φi(D) and qj = φj(D), the
value function must satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, which, for Provider i, is
given by
ρV i(D) = max
 




i − F + α((v + qi)D − τ
D2
2











Maximisation of the right-hand-side of (A3) yields αD − θqi + V i
D
γ
2τ = 0, which, after substitution
of V i
D = σ1 + σ2D, yields
qi = φi(D) =
α
θ





qj = φj(D) =
α
θ




(A3) can therefore be expressed as
ρV i(D) =

     
     
T + (p − c)D − θ
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θD + (σ1 + σ2D)
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2τθ
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     
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γσ1 = 0 (A7)
 
γσ1 + ρσ1 −
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D2 = 0 (A9)





(2θτ (2γ + ρ) − 4αγ) ±
 
(2θτ (2γ + ρ) − 4αγ)
2 + 12αγ2 (θτ − α)
 
.
Since the value function must be concave in order to ensure stable strategies, we select the negative
root. The steady-state level of quality is found by substituting the derived expressions for σ1 (from
(A8)) and σ2 into (A4) or (A5) and setting D = 1
2.
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